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Beware of Educational Blackmail: How Can We Apply Lessons from Environmental Justice to Urban Charter School Growth?

Preston C. Green III[1]* & Chelsea E. Connery[2]**

This Article explains how environmental justice principles can be used in litigation and legislation to enable minority families in urban communities to benefit from charter schools while at the same time protecting against the dangers posed to their school systems and children. In Part II, we explain how environmental justice concepts are designed to protect against environmental blackmail, which is the promise of economic benefits made by polluting companies in exchange for extreme risks to the health of workers and communities where toxic sites are located. In Part III, we describe how a similar form of blackmail may be occurring in urban charter schools—a phenomenon we have coined “educational blackmail.” In Part IV, we analyze environmental justice litigation and charter school litigation. We also assess the extent to which plaintiffs can use environmental justice concepts to address the expansion of urban charter schools. Finally, we examine environmental justice laws to determine how urban school districts and students can utilize the charter school statutes and regulations to better protect themselves against harm.

Introduction

Charter schools are publicly funded schools that are operated by independent groups.[3] Charter schools are exempt from many laws that apply to traditional public schools.[4] Forty-four states and the District of Columbia have charter school legislation.[5] There are more than 7,700 charter schools that serve about 3.4 million students.[6] Charter schools make up about 7.2% of the public-school population.[7]

Charter schools have proven to be popular with Blacks and Latinx within the United States.[8] For example, 2020 poll results from the pro-charter school group Democrats for Education Reform found that 58% of Black Democratic voters had favorable opinions of charter schools while 31% had a negative view.[9] The results for Latinx Democratic voters were similar (52% positive, 30% negative).[10] In contrast, only 26% of White Democratic voters had a favorable view of charter schools while 62% had negative views.[11] Citing these statistics, along with research claiming to show the academic benefits of charter schools for urban communities, supporters of charter schools have called for urban charter school expansion.[12] However, these assertions about academic benefits are debatable.[13] Even if these claims are true, urban charter school expansion poses substantial risks that could become untenable if they are not adequately addressed.[14] These dangers include increased strain on financially stressed districts, predatory real estate deals, and the loss of student rights.[15]

In our search for a legal framework that enables urban communities to take advantage of the purported benefits of charter schools while also mitigating the possible hazards, we have concluded that environmental justice law provides such an approach.[16] The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) defines environmental justice as “the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation[,] and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations[,] and policies.”[17] The EPA defines “fair treatment” to mean that “no group of people should bear a disproportionate share of the negative environmental consequences resulting from industrial, governmental[,] and commercial operations or policies.”[18] Environmental justice law has developed around the principle of reducing the negative impact of polluting facilities.[19] By learning from the lessons of environmental justice, legal strategies can be developed to reduce the negative aspects of urban charter school growth.

This Article explains how environmental justice principles can be used in litigation and legislation to enable minority families in urban communities to benefit from charter schools while at the same time protecting against the dangers posed to their school systems and children. In Part II, we explain how environmental justice concepts are designed to protect against environmental blackmail, which is the promise of economic benefits made by polluting companies in exchange for extreme risks to the health of workers and communities where toxic sites are located. In Part III, we describe how a similar form of blackmail may be occurring in urban charter schools—a phenomenon we have coined “educational blackmail.” In Part IV, we analyze environmental justice litigation and charter school litigation. We also assess the extent to which plaintiffs can use environmental justice concepts to address the expansion of urban charter schools. Finally, we examine environmental justice laws to determine how urban school districts and students can utilize the charter school statutes and regulations to better protect themselves against harm.

Environmental Blackmail

A major goal of the environmental justice movement is to counter the dangers posed by environmental blackmail.[20] This term refers to the corporate practice of convincing minority communities to accept the siting of hazardous waste facilities in exchange for increased employment opportunities.[21] Despite the promise of economic benefits, minority communities do not always benefit from these arrangements.[22] For instance, residents from the immediate locale may fail to obtain employment from the facility.[23] Instead, these jobs may go to residents of distant commuting communities.[24] Also, host communities have generally not obtained significant reimbursements from industries in exchange for the burdens posed by the facility.[25]

Robert Bullard, who is frequently referred to as the “Father of Environmental Justice,”[26] has asserted that Black workers are susceptible to environmental blackmail because of their disproportionate representation in service industries where they can be easily replaced.[27] According to Bullard, polluting industries played on this susceptibility to locate toxic facilities in the southern United States.[28] During the 1970s, this region became a major growth center that attracted new industries, including electronics, defense, and aerospace contracting.[29] However, growth was uneven.[30] Predominantly Black communities could not attract clean industries that required highly skilled workers.[31] In their desperation for economic advancement, community leaders instead sought to attract polluting industries by relaxing the enforcement of environmental laws.[32] Consequently, many industrial firms saw these impoverished areas as “ripe for exploitation.”[33] Thus, environmental blackmail directly contributed to these neighborhoods’ acceptance of health risks that were unacceptable to White communities.[34]

Educational Blackmail

A similar form of environmental blackmail may be occurring in urban, minority neighborhoods with respect to charter school growth. We call this occurrence educational blackmail. Like the Black communities in the southern United States who took a chance on polluting industries, urban communities may be vulnerable to unscrupulous charter school operators. Because of their dissatisfaction with public schooling, urban communities are willing to take a chance with charter schools.[35] However, there is no guarantee that urban communities will benefit from this educational reform. Additionally, they may be exposing themselves to significant risks that come with charter school expansion. The remainder of this Part discusses the attraction that urban communities have to charter schools and the risks they pose. These risks, including increased strain on financially stressed districts, predatory real estate deals, and the loss of student rights, will be discussed in greater detail in Section B.

The Attraction

The research of Stephanie Farmer and associates supports the assertion that urban communities are susceptible to the siren call of charter schools.[36] Their study found that charter schools in Chicago tended to open in Black neighborhoods with declining enrollment instead of more highly populated communities, which would have been more financially efficient for the city school district.[37] While their research did not attempt to determine why charter schools were located in low-demand markets,[38] Farmer and associates offered an explanation that was remarkably similar to Robert Bullard’s analysis on environmental blackmail.[39] According to Farmer and associates, supporters of market reform wished to locate in “politically expedient neighborhoods where parents would be more receptive (and less politically resistant) to marketized charter schools.”[40] Black parents and other residents in these less populated Chicagoan neighborhoods welcomed charter schools because of the state’s failure to provide quality public schooling.[41] Market reformers bolstered support for charter schools in these Black neighborhoods through a massive public relations campaign led by philanthropic foundations and pro-charter community organizations.[42] As a result of this interplay, charter schools expanded in ways that could jeopardize the fiscal stability of the school district.[43]

Supporters of charter school expansion in urban communities are also attempting to gain support by citing research which purportedly shows the educational benefits of charter schools for urban students.[44] For example, an article titled The Case for Urban Charter Schools, published by the Thomas B. Fordham Institute, begins with the sweeping claim that “the evidence for expanding charter schools in urban areas is stronger than ever.”[45] Authors David Griffith and Michael Petrilli go on to argue that charter schools produce higher academic gains, particularly among low-income Black and Latinx students than traditional public schools and positively impact other “long-term, real-world outcomes.”[46] Similarly, the National Alliance for Public Charter Schools publicized a study claiming to show that charter school students—especially Black and low-income students—outperformed traditional public school students on the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP).[47] Finally, in a New York Post article with the triumphant title, Case Closed: Charter Schools Deliver More Education ‘Bang’ for the Buck, Patrick Wolf and Corey DeAngelis promote their study of charter schools in eight cities, claiming that charter schools are more productive than traditional public schools in terms of “learning per education dollar spent.”[48]

Upon closer examination, however, the research cited by these articles paints a picture that is much less straightforward. Indeed, like the promises for jobs often made in environmental blackmail, the claims of academic benefits may be illusory. For example, the Thomas B. Fordham Institute’s article cited a 2013 working paper by Will Dobbie and Roland Fryer that examined the long-term academic outcomes of students who attended the Promise Academy, a charter school located in the Harlem Children’s Zone (HCZ).[49] The study compared the outcomes of students who were selected by lottery to attend the school versus students who were not selected.[50] Students who won the lottery were more likely to enroll in two-year and four-year colleges.[51] According to Dobbie and Fryer, these data suggest that high-performing schools may be sufficient to increase the college enrollment of poor urban students.[52] However, in a subsequent study from the same data, the authors found that the charter school students’ traditional public school counterparts “have almost identical numbers of total semesters enrolled in college”[53] and that “control students eventually catch up and make the treatment effects on college enrollment insignificant.”[54] To choose the earlier working paper instead of the more recent peer-reviewed article is a misleading presentation of their research, which overall indicates—at best—mixed impacts of charter schools on college enrollment.

The National Alliance for Public Charter Schools blog focuses on a study by M. Danish Shakeel and Paul E. Peterson.[55] This study used NAEP reading and math test results for seven different cohorts of fourth and eighth graders to compare performance trends in the charter and traditional public-school sectors between 2005 and 2017.[56] The study attributed the relative differences in results between charter schools and traditional public schools to charter effectiveness.[57] However, this conclusion is unwarranted because the “NAEP does not track the performance of individual students over time.”[58] There are several other factors that could contribute to the differences in school-level patterns of academic performance. Therefore, no causal inferences about the relative effectiveness of charter schools and traditional public schools in raising students’ achievement scores can be drawn.[59]

The New York Post article focuses on two reports by Corey DeAngelis and associates: the first published in 2018[60] and the second in 2019[61] (an update to the original article). Both studies rely on highly contested and oversimplified methods for computing cost-effectiveness.[62] While there are several methodological flaws that undermine the reports’ validity, the overarching issue is that the reports’ findings are merely descriptive and not causal.[63] The lack of causality means that, even if there is evidence of charters having higher scores per $1,000 invested, it cannot be said that this is due to them “do[ing] a better job educating similar students . . . at a lower cost”—it could just be due to the “characteristics of students attracted to the charter school sector.”[64]

The Risks

The other similarity between environmental blackmail and educational blackmail is the assumption of untenable risks. In the case of environmental blackmail, the risks included the health of the community.[65] In the case of charter school expansion, the dangers include increased strain on financially stressed urban districts, predatory real estate deals, and loss of student rights.[66] We elaborate on these hazards in the remainder of this Part.

Increased Stress on Financially Stressed Urban School Districts

When a student enrolls in a charter school, the public school that the student previously attended no longer receives the per-pupil funding for that student.[67] Instead, that funding is shifted to the charter school.[68] Supporters of charter schools claim that this loss of funding causes no harm to school districts because the per-pupil amount of resources for the remaining students stays the same.[69] However, districts must use the remaining funding to pay for fixed costs that cannot be easily adjusted, such as administration, retiree health care benefits, and debts.[70] Districts must also pay for additional costs associated with charter schools, including “transportation, special education evaluation, and health services.”[71] Several studies have attempted to determine the fiscal impact of charter schools on school districts.[72] Controlling for district size, Gordon Lafer found the net loss to school districts for every student who transfers to a charter school ranged from $3,100 to $6,700.[73]

Although charter school expansion has caused school districts to experience financial stress, a study of eleven city school systems found that these systems managed to reduce overhead enough to maintain reasonable class sizes and avoid inefficiently small schools.[74] However, this report also observed that districts experiencing both rapid declines in student population and “particularly inequitable, under-resourced school finance systems have faced substantial annual deficits.”[75]

The experience of the Chester Upland school district, a low-income, predominantly Black district south of Philadelphia, is illustrative. This district has been in financial recovery status since 2012.[76] In 2015, Chester Upland faced a $22 million deficit, which the state governor alleged could have risen to $46 million without state intervention.[77] Pennsylvania’s charter-school funding formula contributed significantly to the district’s financial problems.[78] The state’s school finance system required Chester Upland to give charter schools $40,000 per special education student—regardless of the actual cost to educate the student—which was twice the amount the district spent on its own students with special education needs.[79] The charter schools then gamed the system by under-identifying students for high-cost special education services while over-identifying students in low-cost categories.[80] In a plan to save the financially troubled school district, the governor sought to lower the special education spending from $40,000 to $16,000.[81] A trial court judge rejected this proposal, observing that the plan would not restore the district to financial stability and that the district still owed the charter schools $8.7 million.[82] The parties eventually agreed to reduce the amount that the district needed to pay to charter school’s special education program to $27,028.72, which was still “a significant hit to the [d]istrict.”[83]

Charter school location decisions can also place great strain on fiscally strapped districts.[84] Farmer and associates identified this problem in Chicago, where charter operators and networks do not have to coordinate their location decisions with the district.[85] Indeed, they determined that 69% of charter schools that opened in Chicago between 2000 and 2015 were in areas with significantly declining public-school enrollment.[86] Additionally, almost 80% of the city’s new charter schools began operation within walking distance of a closed public school during that period.[87] Conversely, charter schools were less likely to open near overcrowded public schools, which would have made more sense for the district.[88] Thus, the fiscal stress caused by the charter schools’ location decisions could have weakened the district’s ability to reduce overcrowding in the city’s predominantly Latinx schools.[89] To avoid creating further financial strain, the authors recommend that charter school authorization be connected to a district’s planning process.[90]

Predatory Real Estate Deals

The second risk posed by charter school expansion is predatory real estate deals.[91] Charter schools frequently pay unreasonably high rates for facility leases and land purchases.[92] For example, a 2019 report from the Ohio auditor general revealed that three charter school management companies spent more than twice as much on facilities than was typical for charter schools in the state.[93] The report also conducted a market analysis of nine charter schools operated by these three management companies.[94] According to this analysis, seven schools paid rent that was significantly above market rate, “rang[ing] from $65,560 to $867,170, with a median of $371,495.”[95] Charter school operators obtain these windfalls by leasing property to their subsidiaries.[96] The various governmental gatekeepers at the state and federal level do not have the tools to provide proper oversight over these related-party transactions.[97]

The experience of New Jersey’s charter schools indicates that urban communities may be particularly vulnerable to these predatory real estate deals because of lax supervision.[98] Unlike the state’s traditional public schools that receive public support for facilities, New Jersey’s urban charter schools must “rely on complicated real estate transactions that involve federal tax subsidies.”[99] An investigative report showed how some unscrupulous charter school operators took advantage of this complexity to gouge the charter schools they ran.[100] According to this report, these operators used federal funding to establish networks of privately owned facilities.[101] These operators then charged charter schools rent far exceeding building costs—up to 80%—which charter schools paid with taxpayer funding.[102] Some schools were covering twenty year, interest-only mortgages that started at 10% and increased every year, with one reaching higher than 16%.[103] Another charter school was paying $25 million for an interest-only loan for a building that was bought for $10 million.[104] The report further noted that the state department of education provided no oversight over these arrangements, claiming that it did not have the authority to review lease agreements before they were signed.[105]

If left underregulated, these exploitative real estate deals could eventually restrict the ability of urban school districts to hold charter school operators accountable as well.[106] Because the facilities are privately owned, a district can close a school only if it is willing to build a new facility for its displaced students.[107] As charter school management organizations expand into chains of privately owned schools, Gordon Lafer warns they pose the risk of being “too big to fail.”[108] In other words, these chains may reach a point where school officials “can no longer afford to hold them accountable, because they cannot afford to close and replace them.”[109] This concern may be especially true for urban school districts that already endure financial hardship.

Loss of Student Rights

The final risk that charter school expansion poses to urban communities is the possible loss of student rights.[110] Although charter schools are commonly referred to as “public schools,” courts have on three occasions rejected claims that charter schools have to provide student rights protections afforded to students attending traditional public schools.[111] In Scott B. v. Board of Trustees of Orange County High School of Arts, a California appellate court held that statutory requirements for student expulsions did not apply to charter schools.[112] The court observed that the state’s education code generally exempted charter schools from laws applying to public schools with several exceptions.[113] The expulsion statute was not included among those exceptions.[114]

In I.H. v. Oakland School for the Arts, a federal district court dismissed a charter school student’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for violation of the Equal Protection Clause because the charter school was not a state actor.[115] The court relied on Caviness v. Horizon Learning Center, a Ninth Circuit case that held an Arizona charter school was not a state actor for employment purposes.[116] The Caviness court denied the assertion that charter schools had to provide due process protections merely because Arizona law defined charter schools as “public schools.”[117] Similarly, the district court reasoned it was doubtful that California charter schools were state actors in a student-brought equal protection claim merely because state law declared that charter schools are “public schools.”[118]

Finally, in Peltier v. Charter Day School, Inc., the Fourth Circuit held that a charter school was not a state actor for Equal Protection Clause purposes.[119] Therefore, a North Carolina charter school’s dress code, which required girls to wear skirts, was not subject to this constitutional provision.[120] The court also cited the Caviness case, observing that North Carolina’s designation of charter schools as “public schools” was insufficient for concluding that the charter school was a state actor.[121] The court further noted that the charter school statute kept the state from being involved with the charter school’s day-to-day operations, particularly the dress code.[122] This decision was vacated, and the Fourth Circuit granted a rehearing en banc to decide whether North Carolina’s charter schools are state actors under the Equal Protection Clause.[123] It had not issued a ruling at the time of this Article’s publication.[124]

Bruce Baker laments that discussions over charter school expansion rarely consider whether “children and families should be required to trade constitutional or statutory rights for the promise of the possibility of a measurable test score gain.”[125] Certainly, the Peltier case is especially worrying for Black girls with Afrocentric hairstyles who are thinking about enrolling in a charter school. Charter schools are notorious for using vague language in their dress codes—for example, requiring hairstyles not to “‘interfere with the learning process,’ or be ‘faddish,’ or ‘inappropriate’”—to prohibit Black girls from wearing braids, dreadlocks, Afro-puffs and twists.[126] One instance occurred at Mystic Valley Regional Charter School, a suburban charter school with a dress code that banned “drastic or unnatural hair colors or styles” as well as “hairstyles that might be ‘distracting’ to others.”[127] After the school imposed disciplinary sanctions on two Black girls for violating the policy, the ACLU of Massachusetts filed a complaint with the state department of education, stating that the hair policy was “especially harmful to female students of color” and had been “enforced in a disparate manner against them.”[128] The charter school decided to suspend the policy for the remainder of the school year.[129]

The lack of due process protection is also worrying because of the prevalence of “no-excuses” charter schools.[130] No excuses charter schools share several traits including extended school days and years, frequent student assessments, emphasis on basic skills, and a focus on attending college.[131] These schools also have strict disciplinary systems.[132] They generally prohibit students from talking quietly in hallways, entering and leaving classrooms on their own, keeping backpacks at their desks, or leaving their seats without permission.[133] While no-excuses schools have been lauded for the achievement gains of students,[134] they have also received criticism for their high suspension rates.[135] For example, in 2019, Massachusetts education officials ordered Roxbury Prep, a no-excuses charter school that is part of the Uncommon Schools management company, to lower its suspension rates.[136] The state took this step because Roxbury Prep had suspended 21.1% of its students the prior school year.[137] This rate was much higher than the state average of 2.9%.[138] Because of suspension rates like Roxbury Prep’s, urban students should be concerned about attending no-excuses charter schools.

Applying Environmental Justice Principles to Charter School Litigation

Environmental justice law provides a legal framework for addressing the dangers of environmental blackmail. One tool for attaining environmental justice is litigation.[139] Similarly, plaintiffs have sued to prevent or mitigate the negative effects of urban charter school growth.[140] This Part analyzes environmental justice litigation and then briefly discusses charter school litigation, and the lessons that can be learned for those pursuing charter school “educational justice” lawsuits.

Environmental Justice

Unfortunately for plaintiffs, federal environmental justice litigation has generally resulted in few victories.[141] Originally, plaintiffs claimed that the actions of polluters violated the equal protection or due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of Black residents living in predominantly Black neighborhoods.[142] These challenges failed because plaintiffs could not prove that the government had acted with discriminatory intent when granting the permits at issue in the litigation.[143] Plaintiffs then based their claims on Section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits recipients of federal funds from discriminating against racial groups.[144] These cases also failed because plaintiffs could not establish discriminatory intent.[145]

For a while, it appeared that plaintiffs could mount environmental justice challenges under Title VI’s regulatory provisions that prohibit recipients of federal funding from engaging in policies that have a racially disparate impact.[146] However, the Supreme Court closed this avenue in Alexander v. Sandoval[147] by holding that private parties could not bring lawsuits under this provision.[148]

Because of the failures of constitutional and civil rights litigation, plaintiffs shifted their litigation focus to the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA).[149] Although the NEPA contains no environmental justice provisions, then-President Bill Clinton issued Executive Order 12898 in 1994, which requires every federal agency to “make achieving environmental justice part of its mission by identifying . . . disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and low-income populations.”[150] The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), the agency responsible for developing regulations to assess the environmental impact of proposed projects, developed guidance explaining the role that environmental justice can play in agency decision making.[151] However, environmental justice claims under the NEPA have failed because the statute does not require a particular outcome based on the assessment.[152]

In contrast, state environmental justice statutes may provide a more promising tool for environmental justice litigation.[153] The key case for showing this promise is Friends of Buckingham v. State Air Pollution Control Board.[154] In this case, the plaintiffs challenged the Virginia Air Pollution Control Board’s granting of a minor source permit for a compressor station that was linked to a natural gas pipeline.[155] The compressor would be in Virginia’s historic Black community of Union Hill in Buckingham County.[156]

The Fourth Circuit ruled that the Board failed to perform a proper environmental justice analysis as required by the state’s Commonwealth Energy Policy, which provided that the “development of new, or expansion of existing, energy resources or facilities does not have a disproportionate adverse impact on economically disadvantaged or minority communities.”[157] One problem was that the Board failed to determine whether Union Hill was an environmental justice community.[158] This label mattered because the Board would then have to consider the greater prevalence of asthma and other health issues in Black populations.[159] Instead, the Board relied on National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) and state emissions standards.[160] The Board’s failure to consider the disparate impact led to a flawed analysis.[161] As the court explained, “[E]nvironmental justice is not merely a box to be checked.”[162]

Friends of Buckingham shows the potential of state law for initiating environmental justice lawsuits.[163] The lawsuit was successful because of the strong language of the state’s Commonwealth Energy Policy.[164] If this case were decided under prior case law, the agency would have probably prevailed because there only needed to be evidence that there was some consideration of the environmental justice implications before granting the approval.[165] Two Board members had stated on the record that they had assumed that Union Hill was an environmental justice community.[166] Because of this assumption, there would have been “some” consideration of environmental justice.[167] However, the Commonwealth Energy Policy required the Board to do more than merely assume.[168] Thus, the Board also had to conduct an analysis that was tailored to the environmental justice community.[169]

Charter Schools

Similar to environmental justice litigation, challenges to charter school policies and practices based on federal anti-discrimination provisions will probably fail. Villanueva v. Carere illustrates the difficulty of making Equal Protection Clause challenges.[170] In this case, Latinx parents objected to a Colorado school district’s decision to close two neighborhood elementary schools and open a charter school.[171] When the public schools closed, some students had to ride buses or cross busy intersections to attend new, overcrowded schools.[172] The Tenth Circuit held that the district’s decision did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because the plaintiffs had failed to show that discrimination was a motivating factor for the district’s actions.[173] Title VI’s disparate impact challenges are also unavailable for plaintiffs in the charter school arena because of previously discussed Sandoval case.[174]

Therefore, plaintiffs must base their legal challenges on state education statutes and regulations.[175] If these laws contain strongly worded provisions like Virginia’s Commonwealth Energy policy, urban plaintiffs can prevail in litigation challenging practices by charter school operators and related parties that harm their students and school districts.[176] Of the three categories of potential risks we identified in Part III, we only found decisions relating to student rights. The outcomes of these cases went against the plaintiffs because the state laws failed to provide sufficient protections for students.[177] This outcome suggests that parents, community groups, and civil rights organizations should lobby legislatures to strengthen the educational justice provisions of charter school statutes and regulations.

Indeed, this happened in California in response to the Scott B. decision, which found that charter schools did not have to provide the same level of due process protections as traditional public schools.[178] In response to intensive pressure,[179] California enacted AB 1360, which strengthened due process requirements for students attending charter schools.[180] Charter schools must now comply with federal and state constitutional requirements for suspensions and expulsions.[181] The statute also provides procedures for suspensions and expulsions.[182] For suspensions of fewer than ten days, charters must provide oral or written notice of the charges and give the student the chance to present their side of the story.[183] For suspensions of ten or more days, charters must provide timely, written notice of the charges and an explanation of their basic rights.[184] Furthermore, charters must provide a hearing judged by a neutral officer at which the student can present testimony, evidence, and witnesses; cross-examine adverse witnesses; and bring legal counsel or an advocate.[185] Thus, the passage of AB 1360 shows that persons and groups interested in improving charter school protections can successfully advocate for change.

Applying Environmental Principles to Charter School Legislation and Regulation

Environmental Justice

In the environmental litigation context, plaintiffs have also had limited success before legislative agencies at the federal level.[186] Eileen Gauna provided a cogent explanation for this ineffectiveness.[187] She sought to determine how much environmental justice figures into the EPA’s permitting process.[188] She answered this question by analyzing several important permit decisions by the Environmental Appeals Board (EAB), the final decision maker on administrative appeals issued by the EPA’s regional directors.[189] She found that permit writers were reluctant to impose significant permit decisions or deny permits because of environmental justice considerations.[190] The EAB also avoided making environmental justice inquiries by applying a deferential review of permit decisions.[191] To remedy this problem, Gauna advised the EPA to “provide more specific guidance concerning measures that can be taken to address environmental justice considerations.”[192]

Charter Schools

In the remainder of this Part, we analyze the extent to which charter school statutes protect urban communities from the dangers of increased strain on financially stressed districts, predatory real estate deals, and loss of student rights. We have accomplished this task by performing a Westlaw search of state statutes and regulations. We also apply Gauna’s admonition that the legislative and regulatory tools provided for charter school oversight must have the power to take appropriate action.

Increased Strain on Financially Stressed Urban Districts

We have explained how charter school proliferation can cause severe fiscal strain to urban school districts that are underfunded. In this Subpart, we examine the extent to which charter school laws protect school districts from fiscal harm. Table 1 displays those states that require some consideration of the fiscal impact to districts. Six states require authorizers to consider the fiscal or financial impact of the proposed charter school.[193] Authorizers decide whether to open a charter school, supervise the schools for which they are responsible, and determine whether to revoke or renew charters.[194] Various entities may serve as authorizers including “school districts . . . state education agencies, independent boards, universities, mayors and municipalities, and non-profit organizations.”[195] Three states require authorizers to determine whether the proposed charter school will have an “adverse effect[]” or “adverse impact” on school districts where the school will be located.[196] Two states require authorizers to consider whether the proposed charter school will be “economically sound for the charter school and the school district.”[197]

Table 1: Jurisdictions That Require Consideration of Fiscal Impact of Proposed Charter School on School District[198]

Type of Provision Jurisdiction
Must Consider Fiscal or Financial Impact California,[199] Delaware,[200] New York,[201] Rhode Island,[202] Tennessee,[203] Wisconsin[204]
Must Determine Whether Charter School Will Have Adverse Effect or Impact New Mexico,[205] Oregon,[206] South Carolina[207]
Requires Consideration of Whether School Will Be Economically Sound for the Charter School and District Illinois,[208] Wyoming[209]

However, three states—California, Kentucky, and Missouri—go further than the provisions listed in Table 1 by requiring additional consideration for districts that are in financial stress. California’s requirement apply to districts that are “not positioned to absorb the fiscal impact of the proposed charter school.”[210] Charter schools proposed in such districts are “subject to a rebuttable presumption of denial.”[211] This provision covers districts that have a qualified interim certification and can show that approving the school would cause the district to receive a negative certification.[212] Districts that have a negative interim certification or are under receivership also qualify.[213]

Kentucky empowers school district superintendents to provide evidence objecting to the approval of charter school applications that may cause “substantial hardship” to district students who would not attend the charter school.[214] Authorizers must review the superintendents’ evidence before approving such applications.[215] This term means “significant, unique, and demonstrable economic . . . impact on a district that impairs the district’s ability to continue to successfully meet the requirements of educational programs of services for the district’s students.”[216]

Missouri has imposed additional protection for districts that have received provisional accreditation because of financial stress or hardship.[217] The state board of education must vote to grant the charter “during the third consecutive school year after the designation of provisional accreditation.”[218] The authorizer is limited only to the local school board or an authorizer who has met state accountability and performance standards.[219] These provisions are good because they give the district a three-year buffer to recover from financial difficulty and take steps to ensure they are supervised by responsible authorizers.

Other states should follow the lead of these three states and create similar protections for fiscally strapped urban school districts. Such approaches would enable charter school authorizers to scrutinize charter school proposals in fiscally stressed urban districts to determine whether they can cope with the addition of charter schools.[220]

Predatory Real Estate Deals

In Part III of this Article, we explained how urban charter schools have been subject to predatory real estate deals through complicated related-party transactions. These deals have caused them to pay leases and rents that are significantly in excess of reasonable market rates for facilities that the public will never own.[221] In the case of New Jersey, state authorizers failed to police these deals because they claimed not to have this responsibility.[222] Our review of charter school laws provides some guidance for states that wish to avoid similar fates.

Three states specifically require charter school gatekeepers to take explicit steps to ensure that lease agreements are not exploitative.[223] Maine requires charter school authorizers to review leases between charter schools and education service providers to “align with market rates.”[224] Ohio prohibits charter school governing boards from signing a lease until an independent real estate professional verifies that the lease was “commercially reasonable.”[225] Utah requires charter schools to submit leases and lease purchases to the school’s authorizer and an attorney for review before entering into these agreements.[226] Other states, too, should clearly identify who has the responsibility to review potential lease agreements to ensure that urban school districts do not waste their resources.

We also advise states to be alert for lease proposals that could eventually lead to school districts’ losing the ability to exercise accountability over failing charter schools. As we noted in Part III, Gordon Lafer warned that charter school chains in urban communities can become “too big to fail” because districts cannot afford to pay the construction costs for new buildings.[227] If a charter-school proposal poses this danger, the law should empower the authorizer to reject it.

Loss of Student Rights

Finally, we have explained how urban charter school students may be unwittingly signing away their constitutional and statutory rights when they enroll in a charter school. In several decisions, courts have found that charter-school students do not have the same constitutional and statutory student rights protections that traditional public-school students receive.[228] To remove all doubt, charter school laws should clearly state that charter school students have the same rights as traditional public-school students. Unfortunately, only Rhode Island provides such protection.[229] Its law declares, “All students and prospective students of a charter school shall be deemed to be public school students, having all the same rights under federal and Rhode Island law as students and prospective students at a non-chartered public school.”[230] We think all charter school laws should have similar language.

At a minimum, students attending charter schools should have the same level of anti-discrimination and due process protections enjoyed by their traditional public-school counterparts. Black girls attending charter schools especially need equal protection because of the prevalence of dress codes that have been used to punish them for wearing cultural hairstyles. Robust due process is also essential because of the ubiquity of no-excuses charter schools that are quick to suspend and expel their students.

Table 2 identifies jurisdictions that give charter school students the same protections against discrimination that apply to traditional public schools. We looked for such language because of the Fourth Circuit panel decision in Peltier v. Charter Day School, Inc., which was subsequently vacated for en banc consideration.[231] The panel held that the Equal Protection Clause did not apply to North Carolina charter schools even though the state law prohibits charter schools from “discriminat[ing] against any student on the basis of ethnicity, national origin, gender, or disability.”[232] Arguably, the panel could have inferred from that language that the state legislature intended charter schools to comply with the Equal Protection Clause. However, the panel failed to do so, possibly because the statutory provision failed to make this intention clear. While the Fourth Circuit may eventually rule differently based on this statutory language, this conclusion is not guaranteed. Therefore, state legislatures must explicitly state their expectation that charter schools provide the same level of anti-discriminatory protections as those afforded to their public-school counterparts.[233]

Eight jurisdictions subject charter schools to constitutional provisions prohibiting discrimination based on race, sex, and national origin.[234] Iowa requires charter schools to follow federal and state laws prohibiting discrimination on these bases.[235] Six states require charter schools to comply with all federal and state anti-discrimination laws.[236] Six states prohibit charter schools from discriminating in a manner that would be illegal if done by a traditional public school.[237] Six states require charter schools to follow the same state law protections against discrimination that apply to traditional public schools.[238] Finally, five states specifically extend their protections against discrimination to protective hairstyles including braids, locks, and twists.[239] Jurisdictions that want to protect Black girls should not only impose public-school anti-discrimination provisions on charter schools, but also protect charter schools from disciplining them because of their cultural hairstyles.

Table 2: Jurisdictions That Give Students Attending Charter Schools the Same Anti-Discrimination Protections That Traditional Public-School Students Receive

Type of Provision Jurisdiction
Subject Charter Schools to Constitutional Provisions Prohibiting Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, and National Origin Colorado,[240] Idaho,[241] Illinois,[242] Indiana,[243] New Mexico,[244] South Carolina,[245] Tennessee,[246] Wyoming[247]
Require Charter Schools to Comply with Federal and State Laws Prohibiting Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, and National Origin Iowa[248]
Require Charter Schools to Comply with All Federal and State Anti-Discrimination Laws Arkansas,[249] Maryland,[250] Nevada,[251] New Hampshire,[252] New Jersey,[253] Oregon[254]
Prohibit Charter Schools from Discriminating in Manner That Would Be Illegal if Done by Traditional Public School Alabama,[255] Georgia,[256] Kentucky,[257] Maine,[258] Mississippi,[259] West Virginia[260]
Require Charter Schools to Follow State Laws Prohibiting Discrimination That Apply to Public Schools Connecticut,[261] Florida,[262] Minnesota,[263] New York,[264] Pennsylvania,[265]Washington[266]
Extend Hair Protection to Protective Hair Styles (e.g., braids, locks, and twists) Colorado,[267] Illinois,[268] New Mexico,[269] New York,[270] Oregon[271]

Table 3 identifies jurisdictions where charter schools must give their students the same level of due process for suspensions and expulsions that traditional public-school students receive. California and New Hampshire require charter schools to comply with federal and state due process requirements.[272] Fifteen states compel charter schools to follow state due process laws that apply to traditional public schools, while the District of Columbia imposes municipal due process requirements on the city’s charter schools.[273] Other jurisdictions need to do likewise.

Table 3: Jurisdictions That Require Charter Schools to Provide Students the Same Due Process Protections as Traditional Public Schools

Type of Provision Jurisdiction
Charter School Must Comply with Federal and State Constitutional Due Process Requirements California,[274] New Hampshire[275]
Charter Schools Must Comply with State Due Process Laws Colorado,[276] Delaware,[277] DC,[278] Illinois,[279] Louisiana,[280] Massachusetts,[281] Missouri,[282] Nevada,[283] North Carolina,[284] Oklahoma,[285] Pennsylvania,[286] Rhode Island,[287] Tennessee,[288] Utah,[289] West Virginia,[290] Wisconsin[291]

Conclusion

We understand that urban communities are engaged in charter school expansion because of their dissatisfaction with traditional public schools. However, they must guard against falling into a trap where they assume undue risks in exchange for academic benefits that may not actually occur. To avoid this danger, we have advocated in this Article for the adoption of legal protections based on environmental justice principles. Taking such actions can help keep urban communities from becoming the victims of educational blackmail.

  1. * John and Maria Neag Professor of Urban Education, Professor of Education of Educational Leadership and Law, University of Connecticut. I thank Idun Green for her editorial support and helpful suggestions. I also thank Bruce Baker, Derek Black, Chris Lubienski, James Kaufman, Julie Mead, Susan deJarnatt, and Joshua Weishart for exploring the ideas presented in the Article with me. In addition, I dedicate this Article to my good friend, the late Ann Goldstein, who was always eager to discuss my research projects. I will miss her valued opinions and friendship.
  2. ** Ph.D. Student, Learning Leadership, and Educational Policy, University of Connecticut.
  3. . Libby Nelson, Everything You Need to Know About Charter Schools, Vox (Apr. 30, 2014, 12:59 PM), https://www.vox.com/2014/4/30/18076968/charter-schools [https://perma.cc/GX84-87KF]. The term “charter” is derived from the contract that a group receives to operate a school. Id.
  4. . Id. Although charter schools are commonly defined as “public schools,” courts have occasionally held that charter schools do not have to provide students the same constitutional and statutory rights that traditional public schools receive. Bruce D. Baker, Econ. Pol’y Inst., Exploring the Consequences of Charter School Expansion in U.S. Cities 50–51 (2016), https://files.epi.org/pdf/109218.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VPH-DC8X]. This Article discusses the implications for urban charter school students throughout this Article.
  5. . Jamison White & Matt Hieronimus, How Many Charter Schools and Students Are There?, Nat’l All. Pub. Charter Schs. (Feb. 9, 2022, 2:14 PM), https://data.publiccharters.org/digest/charter-school-data-digest/how-many-charter-schools-and-students-are-there/ [https://perma.cc/UAL9-APBP].
  6. . Id.
  7. . Id.
  8. . Charles Barone et al., Democrats for Educ. Reform, A Democratic Guide to Public Charter Schools: Public Opinion 1 (2019), http://dfer.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/A-Democratic-Guide-to-Public-Charter-Schools-Public-Opinion.pdf [https://perma.cc/WN3S-ZAAL].
  9. . Id. at 2.
  10. . Id.
  11. . Id.
  12. . See infra Part III.A.
  13. . See infra Part III.A.
  14. . See Baker, supra note 2, at 49–51 (explaining that parents and families may lose constitutional and statutory protections in exchange for improved test scores).
  15. . See infra Part III.B.
  16. . The environmental justice movement began in 1982, when the North Carolina governor chose Warren County to be the dumping for polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). PCBs are toxic materials associated with “liver, blood, nerve and reproductive disorders.” Many suspected the governor picked Warren County because of its lack of political power. The county was the poorest in the state and more than 65% Black. National civil rights and environmental groups joined with concerned citizens to protest the selection of Warren County as the dumping for this toxic substance. Though the protests and demonstrations failed to prevent the establishment of the landfill, this protest sparked the environmental justice movement. Jason Pinney, The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and Environmental Justice: Do the National Environmental Policy Act and the Clean Air Act Offer a Better Way?, 30 B.C. Env’t Affs. L. Rev. 353, 356 (2003).
  17. . Learn About Environmental Justice, U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency (Sep. 22, 2021), https://www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/learn-about-environmental-justice [https://perma.cc/GV7P-7MMK].
  18. . Id.
  19. . Michael B. Gerrard, What Does Environmental Justice Mean in an Era of Global Climate Change?, 19 J. Env’t & Sustainability L. 278, 282–83 (2013).
  20. . See, e.g., Robert Bullard, Environmental Blackmail in Minority Communities, in Race and the Incidence of Environmental Hazards 82, 83–85 (Bunyan Bryant & Paul Mohai eds., 1992) (discussing compensating victims of hazardous waste dumping); Craig Anthony Arnold, Planning Milagros: Environmental Justice and Land Use Regulation, 76 Denv. U. L. Rev. 1, 29 (1998); Richard J. Lazarus, The Meaning and Promotion of Environmental Justice, 5 Md. J. Contemp. Legal Issues 1, 6 (1994); Brandon Ward, The Promise of Jobs: Blackmail and Environmental Justice in Flint, Michigan, 1991-1995, 6 ENV’T JUST. 163, 163 (2013).
  21. . Ward, supra note 18, at 163.
  22. . Lazarus, supra note 18, at 10.
  23. . Id.
  24. . Id.
  25. . Id.
  26. . Tracy Fernandez Rysavy, Interview with Father of Environmental Justice Robert Bullard, Green Am. (2007), https://www.greenamerica.org/green-living/interview-father-environmental-justice-robert-bullard [https://perma.cc/5XZW-3JTQ]; Dr. Robert Bullard: The Father of Environmental Justice, Climate One (Dec. 12, 2019), https://www.climateone.org/audio/dr-robert-bullard-father-environmental-justice [https://perma.cc/TL4Y-29X8]; Gregory Dicum, Meet Robert Bullard, the Father of Environmental Justice, Grist (Mar. 15, 2006), https://grist.org/article/dicum/ [https://perma.cc/R32S-HXYL].
  27. . Robert D. Bullard, Dumping in Dixie: Race, Class, and Environmental Quality 10 (Routledge 2018) (2000).
  28. . Id. at 14.
  29. . Id. at 21.
  30. . Id. at 24.
  31. . Id. at 22.
  32. . Id. at 27.
  33. . Id.
  34. . Id. at 28.
  35. . Stephanie Farmer et al., Challenging the Market Logic of School Choice: A Spatial Analysis of Charter School Expansion in Chicago, 42 J. Urb. Affs. 511, 512 (2020).
  36. . Id. at 529–30.
  37. . Id. at 511.
  38. . Id. at 527.
  39. . Compare id. (arguing that “political expediency” could be one reason that “charter schools are more likely to open in low-demand markets versus higher demand markets”), with Bullard, supra note 25, at 3 (stating that toxic dumping “followed the ‘path of least resistance’”).
  40. . Farmer, supra note 33, at 527.
  41. . Id.
  42. . Id.
  43. . Id. at 528. Farmer and associates argue that a combination of political expediency and the firm-like behavior of charter school operators created this fiscal instability in the Chicago school district. Each charter school operator pursued their short-term interest to expand. The aggregate effect of these individual decisions was to place the district in financial distress. Id. at 527–28. We assert that this explanation also fits the educational blackmail paradigm. Firm-like behavior is a danger that comes with charter school expansion. See Preston C. Green III et al., Are We Heading Toward a Charter School “Bubble”?: Lessons from the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 50 U. Rich. L. Rev. 783, 803 (2016) (explaining how overproduction of charter schools can occur in Black communities).
  44. . David Griffith & Michael J. Petrilli, The Case for Urban Charter Schools, Thomas B. Fordham Inst. (Oct. 14, 2020), https://fordhaminstitute.org/national/commentary/case-urban-charter-schools [https://perma.cc/79YC-H63Z].
  45. . Id.
  46. . Id.
  47. . Christy Wolfe, What a New Harvard Study Shows about Student Performance in Charter Schools, Nat’l All. Pub. Charter Schs. (Sept. 11, 2020), https://www.publiccharters.org/latest-news/2020/09/11/what-new-harvard-study-shows-about-student-performance-charter-schools [https://perma.cc/K4A8-QUYC].
  48. . Patrick Wolf & Corey DeAngelis, Case Closed: Charter Schools Deliver More Education ‘Bang’ for the Buck, N.Y. Post (Apr. 9, 2019), https://nypost.com/2019/04/09/case-closed-charter-schools-deliver-more-education-bang-for-the-buck/ [https://perma.cc/MF8W-KLQC].
  49. . Will Dobbie & Roland G. Fryer, Jr., The Medium-Term Impacts of High-Achieving Charter Schools on Non-Test Score Outcomes (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 19581, 2013), https://www.nber.org/papers/w19581 [https://perma.cc/NXY3-2HGQ].
  50. . Id. at 2.
  51. . Id.
  52. . Id. at 22–23.
  53. . Will Dobbie & Roland G. Fryer, Jr., The Medium-Term Impacts of High-Achieving Charter Schools, 123 J. Pol. Econ. 985, 988 (2015).
  54. . Id. at 1008.
  55. . M. Danish Shakeel & Paul E. Peterson, Changes in the Performance of Students in Charter and District Sectors of U.S. Education: An Analysis of Nationwide Trends, 14 J. Sch. Choice 604 (2020).
  56. . Id. at 605.
  57. . Id. at 625.
  58. . Yongmei Ni & Eunice S. Han, Nat’l Educ. Pol’y Ctr., NEPC Review: Changes in the Performance of Students in Charter and District Sectors of U.S. Education: An Analysis of Nationwide Trends (Program on Education Policy and Governance at Harvard University, September 2020) 3 (2020), https://nepc.colorado.edu/sites/default/files/reviews/TTR%20Ni-Han_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Y9F-QA7U]. This means, “For example, the cohort of fourth graders sampled in 2013 are not the same cohort sampled in 2015, because the fourth graders in 2013 had moved into sixth grade in 2015.” Id at 6. Because a different group of students “is involved in each administration of the NAEP, it is not possible to say that better performance of one year’s cohort reflect a gain in learning from the previous year.” Id. Put another way, school-level NAEP patterns do not tell us anything about individual students’ achievement. Thus, the study cannot make causal connections about the relative effectiveness of charter and traditional public schools in improving individual students’ achievement. Moreover, the general school-level patterns in NAEP scores do not necessarily tell us about relative effectiveness of charter schools as compared to traditional public schools. There may be confounding variables shaping the patterns other than schools’ effectiveness. In this study, confounding variables include issues with student sampling and lack of “special education or English Language Learner (ELL) status” controls, and lack of explanation of student characteristic controls that were employed. Id. at 7.
  59. . Id. at 3.
  60. . Corey A. DeAngelis et al., Bigger Bang, Fewer Bucks? The Productivity of Public Charter Schools in Eight U.S. Cities, (Univ. of Ark., Dep’t of Educ. Reform, Working Paper No. 2018-01, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3125824 [https://perma.cc/7STD-5NEU].
  61. . Corey A. DeAngelis et al., A Good Investment: The Updated Productivity of Public Charter Schools in Eight U.S. Cities, (Univ. of Ark., Dep’t of Educ. Reform, Working Paper No. 2019-09, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3366979 [https://perma.cc/7K3U-GTHA].
  62. . Julian Vasquez Heilig, Nat’l Educ. Pol’y Ctr., NEPC Review: Bigger Bang, Fewer Bucks? (University of Arkansas Department of Education Reform, February 2018) 4–5 (2018), https://nepc.colorado.edu/thinktank/review-roi [https://perma.cc/S99T-DW7H].
  63. . Id. at 9.
  64. . Id. at 10.
  65. . Ward, supra note 18, at 163.
  66. . See Gordon Lafer, In the Pub. Int., Breaking Point: The Cost of Charter Schools for Public School Districts 11 (2018), https://www.inthepublicinterest.org/wp-content/uploads/ITPI_Breaking_Point_May2018FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DBN-VADC] (discussing increased strain on financially stressed urban districts); Derek W. Black et al., Charter Schools Exploit Lucrative Loophole That Would Be Easy to Close, Conversation (Feb. 19, 2019, 6:30 AM), https://theconversation.com/charter-schools-exploit-lucrative-loophole-that-would-be-easy-to-close-111792 [https://perma.cc/78T4-PLPV] (discussing predatory real estate deals); Scott B. v. Bd. of Trs. of Orange Cnty. High Sch. of Arts, 217 Cal. App. 4th 117, 123 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (explaining that charter school students do not have the same constitutional rights as public school students).
  67. . The Spencer Foundation & Public Agenda, Charter Schools in Perspective: A Guide to Research 84 (2018), http://www.in-perspective.org/pages/download-the-guide [https://perma.cc/BQH7-VFPF].
  68. . Id.
  69. . Baker, supra note 2, at 9–10.
  70. . Robert Bifulco & Randall Reback, Fiscal Impacts of Charter Schools: Lessons from New York, 9 Educ. Fin. & Pol’y 86, 96 (2014).
  71. . Id. at 90.
  72. . Lafer, supra note 64, at 18 (listing several studies).
  73. . Id. at 17.
  74. . Baker, supra note 2, at 1; see also Mark Weber, Thomas Fordham Inst., Robbers or Victims?: Charter Schools and District Finances (2021), https://fordhaminstitute.org/national/research/robbers-or-victims-charter-schools-and-district-finances [https://perma.cc/V24W-GN9K] (studying 21 states and finding a positive correlation between market share of independent charter schools and per-pupil spending). Weber posits that the increase in per-pupil spending is mostly for fixed costs. Id at 23. In other words, “the increased per pupil spending simply reflects the reality that districts need to the same job as always, but for fewer students.” Jersey Jazzman, Jersey Jazzman: The Fiscal Impact of Charter Schools on School Districts: Thoughts on My New Report, Nat’l Educ. Pol’y Ctr. (Feb. 23, 2021), https://nepc.colorado.edu/blog/fiscal-impact [https://perma.cc/XVR6-YS2S]. We also note that the study does not examine the impact of charter schools on school districts that are experiencing severe financial distress.
  75. . Baker, supra note 2, at 1.
  76. . Kenny Cooper, Charter Upland School District Confronts the Prospect of Charter Takeover, WHYY (May 9, 2021), https://whyy.org/articles/chester-upland-school-district-confronts-the-prospect-of-charter-takeover/ [https://perma.cc/7PWK-Q5YK].
  77. . Lyndsey Layton, In a Bankrupt Pa. School District, Teachers Plan to Work for Free, Wash. Post (Aug. 28, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/in-a-bankrupt-pa-school-district-teachers-plan-to-work-for-free/2015/08/28/0332898e-4dba-11e5-84df-923b3ef1a64b_story.html [https://perma.cc/859G-BTFE].
  78. . Id.
  79. . Id.
  80. . Guest Column: The Case for the Wolf Recovery Plan, Delco Times (Aug. 19, 2021, 3:02 AM), https://www.delcotimes.com/2015/08/24/guest-column-the-case-for-the-wolf-recovery-plan/ [https://perma.cc/VS3V-BDNF]. Frances Barnes, the author of the open letter published in Delco Times, was the receiver for the Chester Upland school district. Id.
  81. . Laura Benshoff, Updated: Delco Judge Nixes Cuts to Chester-Upland Charter Spending, WHYY (Aug. 25, 2015), https://whyy.org/articles/chester-upland-charters-struggle-to-account-for-40000-price-tag-for-special-education/ [https://perma.cc/Q4CZ-RQR4].
  82. . Id.
  83. . Susan L. DeJarnatt, A Legal Mandate That Authorizers Consider Fiscal and Other Impacts of Charter School Expansion, 121 W. Va. L. Rev. 811, 844 n.135 (2019).
  84. . Farmer et al., supra note 33, at 530.
  85. . Id. at 528.
  86. . Id. at 519.
  87. . Id. at 518.
  88. . Id. at 520.
  89. . Id.
  90. . Id. at 529.
  91. . Black et al., supra note 64.
  92. . Id.
  93. . David Yost, Aud. of State of Ohio, Community School Facility Procurement 12 (2019), https://ohioauditor.gov/auditsearch/Reports/2019/Community_School_Facility_Procurement_Public_Interest_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/837G-8NAC].
  94. . Id. at 22.
  95. . Id.
  96. . Black et al., supra note 64.
  97. . See Preston C. Green III et al., Are Charter Schools the Second Coming of Enron?: An Examination of the Gatekeepers That Protect Against Dangerous Related-Party Transactions in the Charter School Sectors, 93 Ind. L. J. 1121, 1142–59 (2018) (examining “the statutory and regulatory provisions that apply to charter school gatekeepers to identify the tools they will need to meet this challenge”).
  98. . See Laura Waters, This Newspaper Series Says NJ Charter Schools Are a “Flawed Experiment.” That’s Wrong – And the Series Itself Proves That,” N.J. Educ. Rep. (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.njedreport.com/2019/04/04/newspaper-series-says-nj-charter-schools-flawed-experiment-thats-wrong-series-proves/ [https://perma.cc/8MUB-3AC3] (stating that charter schools “borrow[] money to build new facilities and so they have to rely on complicated real estate transactions that involve federal tax subsidies”).
  99. . Id.
  100. . Abbott Koloff & Jean Rimbach, Millions of Your Tax Dollars Have Disappeared into NJ’s Flawed Charter School Experiment (Cashing in on Charter Schools: Part One), NorthJersey.com (Apr. 22, 2020, 11:38 PM) [hereinafter Cashing in on Charter Schools: Part One], https://www.northjersey.com/in-depth/news/watchdog/2019/03/27/nj-charter-schools-nj-tax-money-disappearing/2139903002/ [https://perma.cc/Z498-K3ZZ].
  101. . Id.
  102. . Id.
  103. . Jean Rimbach & Abbott Koloff, How Investors and Developers Use Properties to Cash in on NJ Charter School Growth (Cashing in on Charter Schools: Part Four), NorthJersey.com (Dec. 17, 2019, 6:05 AM) [hereinafter Cashing in on Charter Schools: Part Four], https://www.northjersey.com/in-depth/news/watchdog/2019/03/27/how-investors-and-developers-cash-nj-charter-school-growth/2981158002/ [https://perma.cc/UZ3Z-YE5K].
  104. . Id.
  105. .Abbott Koloff & Jean Rimbach, ‘Clearly It Has Gotten out of Hand’: How NJ Can Fix the Broken Financing for Charter Schools (Cashing in on Charter Schools: Part Five), NorthJersey.com (Apr. 22, 2020, 11:38 PM), https://www.northjersey.com/in-depth/news/watchdog/2019/03/27/how-nj-can-fix-broken-financing-charter-school-system/2981170002/ [https://perma.cc/2ANB-V6WA].
  106. . Cashing in on Charter Schools: Part One, supra note 98.
  107. . Id.
  108. . Gordon Lafer, In the Pub. Int., Spending Blind: The Failure of Policy Planning in California Charter School Funding 37 (2017), https://www.inthepublicinterest.org/wp-content/uploads/FINAL_ITPI_SpendingBlind_April2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QTT-DTV3].
  109. . Id.
  110. . See, e.g., Scott B. v. Bd. of Trs. of Orange Cnty. High Sch. of Arts, 217 Cal. App. 4th 117, 123 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (stating that charter school students are not required to be given hearings prior to expulsion); I.H. v. Oakland Sch. for the Arts, 234 F. Supp. 3d 987, 993 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (granting the charter school’s motion to dismiss a student’s § 1983 claim because plaintiff did not prove that the charter school was a state actor); Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., 590 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that charter school decisions were made by private parties).
  111. . See Scott B. v. Bd. of Trs. of Orange High Sch. of Arts, 217 Cal. App. 4th at 123; I.H. v. Oakland Sch. for the Arts, 234 F. Supp. 3d at 993; Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., 590 F.3d at 818.
  112. . Scott B. v. Bd. of Trs. of Orange Cnty. High Sch. of Arts, 217 Cal. App. 4th at 123.
  113. . Id.
  114. . Id. at 123–24.
  115. . I.H. v. Oakland Sch. for the Arts, 234 F. Supp. 3d at 993.
  116. . Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., 590 F.3d at 818.
  117. . Id. at 813–14.
  118. . I.H. v. Oakland Sch. for the Arts, 234 F. Supp. 3d at 992.
  119. . Peltier v. Charter Day Sch., Inc., 8 F.4th 251, 268 (4th Cir. 2021), reh’g en banc granted, 2021 WL 4892153 (4th Cir. Oct. 19, 2021).
  120. . Id. at 267–68.
  121. . Id. at 263–64 (citing Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., 590 F.3d at 814).
  122. . Id. at 264.
  123. . Peltier v. Charter Day Sch., Inc., No. 20-1001 (L), 2021 WL 4892153 (4th Cir. filed Oct. 19, 2021).
  124. . Id. (granting a rehearing en banc, but not yet rendering a decision).
  125. . Baker, supra note 2, at 51.
  126. . Courtney Nunley, Hair Politics: How Discrimination Against Black Hair in Schools Impacts Black Lives, Politic (May 3, 2019), https://thepolitic.org/hair-politics-how-discrimination-against-black-hair-in-schools-impacts-black-lives/ [https://perma.cc/R4TN-VQZN]. See also The War on Black Girls’ Hair in Charter and Private Schools, Schott Found., http://schottfoundation.org/blog/2017/05/19/war-black-girls-hair-private-and-charter-schools [https://perma.cc/MKQ3-CBQG] (discussing “the worrying trend over braids, dreadlocks, Afro-puffs and twists”).
  127. . Rachel M. Cohen, Massachusetts Charter School Backs off Exclusionary Hair Policies – For Now, Am. Prospect (May 25, 2017), https://prospect.org/education/massachusetts-charter-school-backs-exclusionary-hair-policies-now/ [https://perma.cc/X6ZZ-E42G].
  128. . Id.
  129. . Id.
  130. . Joanne W. Golann, Scripting the Moves: Class, Control, and Urban School Reform 6-7 (May 2016) (Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University) (ProQuest).
  131. . Id. at 9.
  132. . Id. at 10.
  133. . Id.
  134. . See Sarah Cohodes, Charter Schools and the Achievement Gap, The Future of Children, Winter 2018, at 14, https://futureofchildren.princeton.edu/sites/futureofchildren/files/resource-links/charter_schools_compiled.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3FN-4AUK] (arguing that public schools should adopt no-excuses discipline policies to achieve better academic outcomes).
  135. . Matt Barnum, Do Charter Schools Suspend Students More? It Depends on How You Look at the Data, Chalkbeat (Apr. 20, 2018, 2:32 PM), https://www.chalkbeat.org/2018/4/20/21104867/do-charter-schools-suspend-students-more-it-depends-on-how-you-look-at-the-data [https://perma.cc/K5NL-NY2Z].
  136. . James Vaznis, Mass. Has a Message for Roxbury Prep: Lower Your Suspension Rate, Bos. Globe (Mar. 31, 2019, 6:56 PM), https://www3.bostonglobe.com/metro/2019/03/31/roxbury-prep-suspend…ear-state-demanding-improvement/omszp59rLsPlSyq2Mt009J/story.html?arc404=true (last visited Jan. 10, 2022).
  137. . Id.
  138. . Id. High-profile no-excuses charter management companies such as KIPP, Noble, and Achievement First are rethinking their discipline policies and are now considering less prescriptive approaches for their students. Joanne W. Golann, Opinion: Why Are No-Excuses Schools Moving Beyond No Excuses?, Hechinger Rep. (Jun. 10, 2021), https://hechingerreport.org/opinion-why-are-no-excuses-schools-moving-beyond-no-excuses/ [https://perma.cc/N4UE-8AQW]. Part V of this Article discusses steps state legislatures can take to ensure these proposed changes occur. See infra Part V.
  139. . U.S. Comm’n on Civ. Rts., Not in My Backyard: Executive Order 12,898 and Title VI as Tools for Achieving Environmental Justice 79 (2003), https://www.usccr.gov/files/pubs/envjust/ej0104.pdf [https://perma.cc/LP5C-LPEQ].
  140. . See, e.g., In re Renewal Application of TEAM Acad. Charter Sch., 252 A.3d 1008, 1012 (2021) (stating appellant’s concerns that “any expansion of Newark’s charter schools would worsen the District’s financial crisis, thus impeding the District’s effort to deliver a ‘thorough and efficient’ education, and that further growth in charter school enrollment would exacerbate segregation in the District’s schools”).
  141. . Andrea Wortzel et al., State Laws Provide New Pathways for Environmental Justice Claims, 36 Nat. Res. & Env’t 18, 18 (2021).
  142. . Id. at 18–19.
  143. . Id. at 18.
  144. . 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d (West 2021).
  145. . Wortzel et al., supra note 139, at 19.
  146. . Id.
  147. . Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001).
  148. . Wortzel et al., supra note 139, at 19.
  149. . Id.
  150. . Exec. Ord. No. 12898, 59 C.F.R. 7629 (1994).
  151. . Council on Env’t Quality, Environmental Justice: Guidance Under the National Environmental Policy Act (1997), https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2015-02/documents/ej_guidance_nepa_ceq1297.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4EK-WLC3].
  152. . Wortzel et al., supra note 139, at 19.
  153. . See Douglas A. Henderson et al., Environmental Justice Litigation: Few Wins, Still Effective, 36 Nat. Res. & Env’t 17, 19 (2021) (discussing environmental justice litigation under state environmental justice statutes).
  154. . Wortzel et al., supra note 139, at 20 (calling the case “a groundbreaking moment in environmental justice litigation”).
  155. . Friends of Buckingham v. State Air Pollution Control Bd., 947 F.3d 68, 71 (4th Cir. 2020).
  156. . Id.
  157. . Id. at 75. A new statute titled “The Commonwealth Clean Energy Policy” provides: “[I]t shall be the policy of the Commonwealth to . . . [r]ecognize the disproportionate and inequitable impacts of climate change on historically economically disadvantaged communities and prioritize solutions and investment in these communities to maximize the benefits of clean energy and minimize the burdens of climate change.” Va. Code. Ann. § 45.2-1706.1(B)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess. and 2021 Spec. Sess. I (including 2021 Spec. Sess. II, c. 1)).
  158. . Friends of Buckingham, 947 F.3d at 88.
  159. . Id.
  160. . Id. at 90.
  161. . Id. at 92.
  162. . Id.
  163. . Regina Paparo, Case Comment: Not a Box to be Checked: Environmental Justice and Friends of Buckingham v. State Air Pollution Control Board (4th Cir. 2020), 45 Harv. Env’t L. Rev. 219, 231 (2021).
  164. . Id. at 234.
  165. . Id.
  166. . Id.
  167. . Id.
  168. . Id. at 235.
  169. . Id.
  170. . Villanueva v. Carere, 85 F.3d 481 (10th Cir. 1996).
  171. . Id. at 483.
  172. . Id. at 485.
  173. . Id. at 486.
  174. . See Sam Spital, Restoring Brown’s Promise of Equality After Alexander v. Sandoval: Why We Can’t Wait, 19 Harv. Blackletter L.J. 93, 96 (2003) (“Sandoval . . . creates a potentially insurmountable barrier to private parties seeking to bring . . . disparate impact claims, which is particularly troubling in light of recent rollbacks in desegregation and affirmative action, the increased use of high stakes tests, and a general state-level shift in resources from schools to prisons.”).
  175. . Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Designing the Legal Architecture to Protect Education as a Civil Right, 96 Ind. L.J. 51, 70 (2020).
  176. . Adele P. Kimmel et. al, The Sandoval Decision and Its Implications for Future Civil Rights Enforcement, 76 Fla. B.J. 24, 28 (2002).
  177. . See supra Section III.B.3 and accompanying notes.
  178. . Scott B. v. Bd. of Trs. of Orange Cnty. High Sch. of Arts, 217 Cal. App. 4th 117, 124 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013).
  179. . Fair Admissions and Due Process for Charter School Students, ACLU S. Cal., https://www.aclusocal.org/en/kyr-ab1360 [https://perma.cc/44AU-HABX]; New Legislative Push for Charter Accountability, Advocate (Apr. 19, 2017), http://www.sdea.net/wp-content/uploads/SDEA-Advocate-April-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/EF6A-JKYP].
  180. . Assemb. B. 1360, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017).
  181. . Cal. Educ. Code § 47605(c)(5)(J) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 770 of 2021 Reg. Sess.).
  182. . Id.
  183. . Id.
  184. . Id.
  185. . Id.
  186. . Henderson et al., supra note 151, at 18.
  187. . Eileen Gauna, Federal Environmental Justice Policy in Permitting, in Failed Promises 57 (David M. Konisky ed., 2015).
  188. . Id. at 58.
  189. . Id. at 60.
  190. . Id. at 69.
  191. . Id.
  192. . Id. at 78.
  193. . See infra notes 197–202.
  194. . Green III et al., supra note 95, at 1154.
  195. . Nat’l Ass’n Charter Sch. Authorizers, What Is Charter School Authorizing? (2022), https://www.qualitycharters.org/authorizingmatters/ [https://
    perma.cc/MTX2-CT7A].
  196. . See infra notes 203–05.
  197. . See infra notes 206–07.
  198. . According to the West Virginia Code of State Rules, “W. Va. Code § 18-5G-5 outlines the funding of charter schools as well as tools to mitigate the fiscal impact on county school districts.” W. Va. Code R. § 126-79-12.1a (Westlaw through reg. dated Dec. 31, 2021). However, the tools for mitigation provide for only adjustments to general charter school funding rather than mitigation for concerns raised by an individual district that wishes to challenge a proposed charter school. W. Va. Code Ann. § 18-5G-5 (West, Westlaw through Mar. 24, 2022, of the 1st and Reg. Sess.). Therefore, we did not include West Virginia in Table 1.
  199. . Cal. Educ. Code § 47605(c)(7) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 770 of 2021 Reg. Sess.).
  200. . 701 Ky. Admin. Regs. 8:020(4)(6) (Westlaw through amendments included in Admin. Reg. Ky. Vol. 48, No. 10, dated Apr. 1, 2022).
  201. . N.Y. Educ. Law § 2851(2)(q) (McKinney, Westlaw through L. 2021, Chs. 1 to 776).
  202. . 16 R.I. Gen. Laws. Ann. § 16-77.3-3(f) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 429 of the 2021 Reg. Sess. of the R.I. Leg.).
  203. . Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-13-108(c) (West, Westlaw through 2021 3d Extraordinary Sess. of the 112th Tenn. Gen. Assemb.).
  204. . Wis. Stat. Ann. § 118.40(2)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2021 Act 87, published Nov. 12, 2021).
  205. . N.M. Code R. § 6.80.4.12(Q)(3) (West, Westlaw through N.M. Reg. Volume XXXII, Issue 19, Oct. 13, 2021).
  206. . Or. Admin. R. 581-026-0055(2)(f) (Westlaw through Dec. 21, 2021).
  207. . S.C. Code Ann. § 59-40-70(C) (Westlaw through 2021 Act No. 116); S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 43-601(VI) (Westlaw through State Reg. Volume 45, Issue 12) (effective Dec. 24, 2021).
  208. . 105 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/27A-7(a)(9) (West, Westlaw through Public Act 102-691 of the 2021 Reg. Sess.).
  209. . Until July 1, 2022, Wyoming requires charter school applications to provide “[e]vidence that the plan for the charter school is economically sound for both the charter school and the school district.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-3-307(a)(xiv) (West, Westlaw through 2021 Gen. Sess. of the Wyo. Leg.). On that date, the state will merely require applications to provide “evidence that the plan for the charter school is economically sound.” Id.
  210. . Cal. Educ. Code § 47605(c)(8) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 770 of 2021 Reg. Sess.). Louisiana requires the state board of education to help school districts with under 5,000 students determine the financial impact of any proposed charter school upon their request. La. Admin Code. tit. 28, § 305(A)(3) (Westlaw through La. Reg. Vol. 47, No. 10, Oct. 20, 2021).
  211. . Educ. § 47605(c)(8).
  212. . Id. Schools that receive “qualified interim” designation may fail to meet their financial obligations for the current fiscal year or the next two fiscal years. Schools that receive “negative” designation cannot meet its financial obligations for the remainder of the fiscal year or the next fiscal year. Id. § 42131(a)(1).
  213. . Id. § 47605(c)(8).
  214. . 701 Ky. Admin. Regs. 8:020(4)(6) (Westlaw through amendments included in Admin. Reg. Ky. Vol. 48, No. 10, dated Apr. 1, 2022).
  215. . Id.
  216. . Id. at 8:020, (4)(45).
  217. . Mo. Ann. Stat. § 160.400(4)(a), (b) (West, Westlaw through 2021 1st Reg. & 1st Extraordinary Sess. of 101st Gen. Assemb.)
  218. . Id. § (4)(a).
  219. Id. § (4)(b).
  220. . See supra notes 206–15. We acknowledge that fiscally stressed school districts that are authorizers might prohibit the opening of charter schools with little to no consideration of mitigation. See Nat’l Ass’n Charter Sch. Authorizers, Introduction to Multiple Authorizers (2022), https://www.qualitycharters.org/state-policy/multiple-authorizers/
    introduction-to-multiple-authorizers/
    [https://perma.cc/H9J5-ESF9] (“School districts are often reluctant or opposed to approving new charter schools that they perceive as competition for funds and students.”). However, we also recognize that non-district authorizers may not be sufficiently concerned about the fiscal plight of school districts. See Green III et al., supra note 41, at 793 (arguing that independent authorizers may be likely to approve charter schools because they do not assume the risk of charter school failure). To address these concerns, states should require state regulatory agencies, such as state auditing offices, to review authorizer decisions to deny a charter on fiscal grounds.
  221. . Black et al., supra note 64.
  222. . See Cashing in on Charter Schools: Part Four, supra note 101.
  223. . In addition to the three states we have identified, two states also require charter school leases to be “reasonable” or of “fair market” value. Minnesota prohibits charter schools from entering in leases unless they are “reasonable.” Minn. Stat. Ann. § 124E.22(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through Feb. 3, 2022 from the 2022 Reg. Sess.). Washington allows charter schools to contract with any “private entity” to use a “facility for a school building at fair market rent.” Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 28A.710.230(3) (West, Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess. of the Wash. Leg.). Although these requirements are laudable, we did not include them as exemplary provisions because they do not make clear who has the responsibility of ensuring that this quality control does occur.
  224. . 05-071-140 Me. Code R. § 2(8)(E) (West, Westlaw through June 16, 2021 Me. Weekly Rule Notice).
  225. . Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3314.032(B)(1) (West, Westlaw through Files 1-60, 62-68, and 70 of 134th Gen. Assemb. (2021-2022)).
  226. . Utah Code Ann. § 53G-5-404(9) (West, Westlaw through 2021 2d Spec. Sess.).
  227. . Lafer, supra note 106, at 37.
  228. . Scott B. v. Bd. of Trs. of Orange Cnty. High Sch. of Arts, 217 Cal. App. 4th 117, 123 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013 I.H. v. Oakland Sch. for the Arts, 234 F. Supp. 3d 987, 993 (N.D. Cal. 2017); Peltier v. Charter Day Sch., 8 F.4th 251, 267–68 (4th Cir. 2021), reh’g en banc granted, 2021 WL 4892153 (4th Cir. Oct. 19, 2021).
  229. . 16 R.I. Gen. Laws. Ann. § 16-77-3.1(b) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 424 of the 2021 Reg. Sess. of the R.I. Leg.).
  230. . Id. Delaware charter school applications must include a draft “Student Rights and Responsibilities Manual” that satisfies the constitutional requirements for student rights for student rights, “including but not limited to discipline, speech and assembly, [and] procedural due process.” 14-200-275 Del. Admin Code § 4.5.1 (Westlaw through Reg. of Reguls., Volume 25, Issue 6, dated Dec. 1, 2021).
  231. . Peltier v. Charter Day Sch., Inc., 8 F.4th 251, 268 (4th Cir. 2021), reh’g granted, 2021 WL 4892153 (4th Cir. Oct. 19, 2021).
  232. . N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 115C-218.55 (West, Westlaw through Sess. L. 2021-192 of the 2021 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.).
  233. . See Green III et al., The Legal Status of Charter Schools in State Statutory Law, 10 U. Mass. L. Rev. 240, 275 (2015) (explaining that courts have determined whether charter schools are “public” under state statutory provisions based on the applicable statutory language).
  234. . See infra notes 238–45.
  235. . See infra note 246.
  236. . See infra notes 247–52.
  237. . See infra notes 253–58.
  238. . See infra note 259–64.
  239. . See infra notes 265–69. Delaware prohibits charter schools from “[d]iscriminat[ing] against any student in the admissions process because of race, creed, color, sex (except in the case of a same-gender school).” Del. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 506(a)(4) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 266 151st Gen. Assemb. (2021-2022)) (emphasis added). This provision includes “protective hairstyles” such as “braids, locks, and twists.” Id. We did not include Delaware in our list of exemplary provisions because of its limitation to admissions decisions.
  240. . Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22-30.5-507(3)(a) (West, Westlaw through end of 1st Reg. Sess. of the 73rd Gen. Assemb. (2021)).
  241. . Idaho Code Ann. § 33-5206(1) (West, Westlaw through Chs. 1–364 and S.J.R. No. 102 of 2021 1st Reg. Sess. of the 66th Idaho Leg., which convened on Jan. 11, 2021).
  242. . 105 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/27A-4(a) (West, Westlaw through Public Act 102-691 of the 2021 Reg. Sess.).
  243. . Ind. Code Ann. § 20-24-2-2 (West, Westlaw through 2021 1st Reg. Sess. of the 122nd Gen. Assemb.) (effective through July 1, 2021).
  244. . N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-8B-4(A) (West, Westlaw through end of 1st Reg. Sess. and 1st Spec. Sess., 55th Leg. (2021)).
  245. . S.C. Code Ann. § 59-40-40(2)(b) (Westlaw through 2021 Act No. 116).
  246. . Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-13-111(b) (West, Westlaw through 2021 3d Extraordinary Sess. of the 112th Tenn. Gen. Assemb.).
  247. . Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-3-304(c) (West, Westlaw through 2021 Gen. Sess. of the Wyo. Leg.).
  248. . Iowa Code Ann. § 256E.7(2)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2022 Reg. Sess.) (effective Mar. 23, 2022).
  249. . Ark. Code R. § 005.01.1-4.01 (West, Westlaw with amendments received through Nov. 15, 2021).
  250. . Md. Code Ann., Educ. § 9-102(8) (West, Westlaw through 2022 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assembl.).
  251. . Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 388A.366(1)(a) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 2 (End) of the 33d Spec. Sess. (2021)).
  252. . N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 194-B:8(I) (Westlaw through Ch. 18 of the 2022 Reg. Sess.).
  253. . N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:36A-11(c) (West, Westlaw through L.2021, c. 499 and J.R. No. 9).
  254. . Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 338.115(1)(a), (v) (West, Westlaw through Ch.1 enacted in the 2022 Reg. Sess. of the 81st Leg. Assemb.).
  255. . Ala. Code § 16-6F-9(c)(1) (Westlaw through end of 2021 Reg. Sess., 2021 1st Spec. Sess., and 2021 2d Spec. Sess.).
  256. . Ga. Code Ann. § 20-2-2066(c) (West, Westlaw through Act 586 of the 2022 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.).
  257. . Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 160.1592(15) (West, Westlaw through end of 2021 Reg. and Spec. Sess. and Nov. 3, 2020 election).
  258. . Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 20-A, § 2412(4)(A) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 598 of the 2022 2d Reg. Sess. of the 130th Leg.).
  259. . Miss. Code Ann. § 37-28-43(1) (West, Westlaw through 2022 Reg. Sess.) (effective through Mar. 30, 2022.).
  260. . W. Va. Code Ann. § 18-5G-11(a)(6) (West, Westlaw through Mar. 24, 2022, from the 2022 1st Special Sess. & Reg. Sess.).
  261. . Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 10-66bb(d)(8)(D) (West, Westlaw through the 2022 Reg. Sess.) (effective Apr. 8, 2022.).
  262. . Fla. Stat. Ann. § 1002.33(9)(f) (West, Westlaw through Apr. 20, 2022, from the 2022 2d Reg. Sess.).
  263. . Minn. Stat. Ann. § 124E.03(4)(b) (West, Westlaw through Apr. 14, 2022, from the 2022 Reg. Sess.).
  264. . N.Y. Educ. Law § 2854(2)(a) (McKinney, Westlaw through L. 2022, Ch. 1–49, 55, 60–174.).
  265. . 24 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. § 17-1732-A(b) (West, Westlaw through 2022 Reg. Sess. Act 20).
  266. . Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 28A.710.040(2)(a) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 181 of the 2022 Reg. Sess.).
  267. . Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22-30.5-507(3)(a), (b)(I) (West, Westlaw through end of the 1st Reg. Sess. of the 73rd Gen. Assemb. (2021)).
  268. . 105 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/27A-5(g)(19) (West, Westlaw through Public Act 102-695 of the 2021 Reg. Sess.).
  269. . N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-8B-4(A) (West, Westlaw through end of 1st Reg. Sess. and 1st Spec. Sess., 55th Leg. (2021)).
  270. . N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8, § 100.2(kk)(1)(ix)–(xi) (Westlaw through amendments included in N.Y. State Reg., Volume XLIV, Issue 2 dated Jan. 12, 2022).
  271. . Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 338.115(1)(v) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 1 of the 2022 Reg. Sess. of the 81st Leg. Assemb.).
  272. . See infra note 272–73.
  273. . See infra notes 274–89.
  274. . Cal. Educ. Code § 47605(c)(5)(J) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 770 of 2021 Reg. Sess.).
  275. . N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 194-B:8(I) (Westlaw through end of the 2021 Reg. Sess.).
  276. . Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22-30.5-505(9) (West, Westlaw through end of the 1st Reg. Sess. of the 73rd Gen. Assemb. (2021)).
  277. . Del. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 122(b)(26) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 266 of the 151st Gen. Assemb. (2021-2022)); 14-600 Del. Admin. Code § 616 (Westlaw through amendments included in Del. Reg. of Reguls., Volume 25, Issue 6, dated Dec. 1, 2021).
  278. . D.C. Code Ann. § 38-1802.06(g)(1) (West, Westlaw through Nov. 13, 2021).
  279. . 105 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/27A-5(g) (West, Westlaw through Public Act 102-695 of the 2021 Reg. Sess.).
  280. . La. Stat. Ann. § 17:3996(B)(2), (3), (40) (Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess. and Veto Sess.); La. Admin. Code. tit. 28 § 4003(A)(2), (3), (39) (Westlaw through rules published in La. Reg. Vol. 47, No. 10, Oct. 20, 2021).
  281. . Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 71, § 89(p) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 97 of the 2021 1st Ann. Sess.).
  282. . Mo. Code Regs. Ann. tit. 5, § 20-100.260(4)(H)(1) (Westlaw through Dec. 31, 2021).
  283. . Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 388A.495(2) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 2 (End) of the 33d Spec. Sess. (2021)).
  284. . N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 115C-218.60 (West, Westlaw through Sess. Law 2021-147, of the 2021 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.).
  285. . Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 70, § 3-136(A)(12) (West, Westlaw through Leg. of the 1st Reg. Sess. of the 58th Leg. (2021), and chs. 2, 4, 5, and 6 of the 1st Extraordinary Sess.).
  286. . 24 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. § 17-1719-A(7) (West, Westlaw through 2021 Reg. Sess. Act 100).
  287. . 16 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 16-77-6.1(d) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 429 of the 2021 Reg. Sess. of the R.I. Leg.).
  288. . Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-13-111(p)(8) (West, Westlaw through 2021 3d Extraordinary Sess. of the 112th Tenn. Gen. Assemb.).
  289. . Utah Admin. Code r 277-552-6(2)(a)(iv) (West, Westlaw through Utah State Bulletin No. 2021-21, Nov. 15, 2021).
  290. . W. Va. Code Ann. § 18-5G-8(b)(12) (West, Westlaw through Mar. 24, 2022, of the 2022 1st Special Sess. & Reg. Sess. 2021).
  291. . Wis. Stat. Ann. § 118.40(2x)(b)(6)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2021 Act 87, published Nov. 12, 2021).