Sky Angel U.S., LLC v. Discovery Communications, LLC (Diaz 3/15/2018): The Fourth Circuit held that a district court does not commit any error in allowing extrinsic evidence to be presented to resolve an ambiguous provision of a contract and that the district court’s interpretation of such evidence is not clearly erroneous where the appellant repeatedly assures the respondent that the respondent’s construction of the provision is correct. Here, Discovery terminated its contract with Sky Angel because Sky Angel engaged in conduct that Discovery said violated the contract. Sky Angel argued that it was entitled to perform the alleged misconduct under the contract, but the Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court that the contract was sufficiently ambiguous to warrant review of extrinsic evidence, which led the court to conclude Discovery terminated its agreement with Sky Angel in good faith. The court further held that Discovery did not waive its attorney-client privilege and thereby fail to produce other privileged information because Sky Angel failed to prove the disclosure of a communication in confidence between a lawyer and a client related to legal advice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. Full Opinion
Niya Kenny v. Alan Wilson (Diaz 3/15/2018): The Fourth Circuit held that plaintiffs have standing to challenge state laws for being unconstitutionally vague when they plead an imminent injury in fact by showing an intent to engage in conduct that would inevitably violate the statutes and that they face a credible threat of prosecution for their conduct, and separately when they sufficiently allege that self-censorship chills the exercise of their right to free expression. The appellants, current and former students, challenged South Carolina laws criminalizing “disturbing schools” and “disorderly conduct” as unconstitutionally vague because they could be prosecuted for any minor perceived infraction, and the court agreed that the appellants suffered an injury in fact because they could not predict the type of conduct that would lead to an arrest. The court also stated that a “sufficient showing of self-censorship” could create an imminent injury in fact and determined that the appellants made a sufficient showing of self-censorship as they were chilled from exercising their right to free expression. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court’s dismissal of the case for lack of standing and remanded for further proceedings. Full Opinion
Trey Sims v. Kenneth Labowitz (Keenan 3/14/2018): The Fourth Circuit held that a law enforcement officer is not entitled to qualified immunity in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action where the officer executes a warrant prescribing conduct that a reasonable police officer would have known violates a person’s right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment. The court reasoned that although a search warrant creates a rebuttable presumption that the search was reasonable, the officer in this case should have known that demanding a 17-year-old boy to manipulate his penis to achieve an erection was unlawfully sexually invasive and “the alleged conduct plainly did not qualify as the type of ‘bad guesses in gray areas’ that qualified immunity is designed to protect.” The court therefore vacated the district court’s grant of qualified immunity and dismissal of the appellant’s sexual exploitation of a child claim, affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the appellant’s remaining claims, and remanded for further proceedings. Full Opinion
Janet Hodgin v. UTC Fire & Security Americas (Duncan 3/14/2018): The Fourth Circuit held that a Rule 56(d) motion to postpone a summary judgment ruling is properly denied when the motion does not identify any specific information that would create a genuine dispute of material fact and the movant has been given a reasonable opportunity to obtain the information. The court also determined that the evidence presented only amounted to conclusory or speculative accusations. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of Plaintiff’s Rule 56(d) motion and the district court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment for Defendants. Full Opinion
Intl Brotherhood Local 639 v. Airgas, Incorporated (Harris 3/13/2018): The Fourth Circuit held that an appeal of a preliminary injunction is rendered moot after an arbitrator makes a final decision in Respondent’s favor during the appeal and the preliminary injunction expires on its own terms. Here, the appellant was a company seeking to relocate its operations to a non-unionized area and a union obtained a preliminary injunction to bar the move. After the company appealed the injunction, an arbitrator ruled the company did not have a right to relocate, the arbitration concluded, and the injunction expired by its own terms. The court reasoned that a party may recover damages for a preliminary injunction wrongfully entered only if the injunction prevented it from doing something that it had the legal right to do. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal as moot. Full Opinion
US v. Junaidu Savage (Floyd 3/12/2018): The Fourth Circuit held that a defendant is not entitled to an in camera review to determine whether material required disclosure under the Jencks Act or under Brady v. Maryland when he fails to specify what additional inconsistent statements existed, merely speculates that such statements might exist, and fails to show how such statements would be material. The court also agreed with the lower court’s denial of the appellant’s motion for acquittal, refusal to provide the jury with a written copy of the jury instruction, and application of the sentencing guidelines. Accordingly, the court affirmed the decision of the district court. Full Opinion.
US v. Kaylan Jay Bell (Traxler 3/12/2018): The Fourth Circuit held that an adult’s attempts at hands-on child molestation could be considered sexually violent conduct under 18 U.S.C. § 4247, the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, whereby the government may civilly commit a “sexually dangerous person” after the expiration of the person’s prison sentence. The court reasoned that the statute expressly considers attempts to engage in such conduct, and because this conduct could be considered sexually violent in nature, the appellant would have difficulty in refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation if released and could be civilly committed as a sexually dangerous person. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting civil commitment under the Adam Walsh Act. Full Opinion.
Niya Kenny v. Alan Wilson, No. 17-1367
Decided: March 15, 2018
The Fourth Circuit held that plaintiffs have standing to challenge state laws for being unconstitutionally vague when they plead an imminent injury in fact by showing an intent to engage in conduct that would inevitably violate the statutes and that they face a credible threat of prosecution for their conduct, and separately when they sufficiently allege that self-censorship chills the exercise of their right to free expression. The appellants, current and former students (the “Students”), challenged South Carolina laws criminalizing “disturbing schools” and “disorderly conduct” as unconstitutionally vague because they could be prosecuted for any minor perceived infraction, and the court agreed that the Students suffered an injury in fact because they could not predict the type of conduct that would lead to an arrest. The court also stated that a “sufficient showing of self-censorship” could create an imminent injury in fact and determined that the Students made a sufficient showing of self-censorship as they were chilled from exercising their right to free expression. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court’s dismissal of the case for lack of standing and remanded for further proceedings.
The lawsuit brought by the Students challenged the Disturbing Schools Law (S.C. Code Ann. § 16-17-420(A)) as unconstitutionally vague on its face. The Disturbing Schools Law stated, among other things, that it shall be unlawful for any person willfully or unnecessarily to act in an obnoxious manner. The Students challenged the Disorderly Conduct Law (S.C. Code Ann. § 16-17-530) as it is applied to elementary and secondary public schools. The Disorderly Conduct Law criminalized, among other things, any person who is found at any public place or public gathering in a grossly intoxicated condition, otherwise conducting himself in a disorderly or boisterous manner, or using obscene or profane language. The Students alleged that the statutes were enforced in a discriminatory manner, stating that “black students in South Carolina were nearly four times as likely to be charged under the Disturbing Schools Law compared to their white classmates.” Most of the Students were black and had been arrested and prosecuted under these laws in the past. The district court held that the Students lacked standing to bring the suit because their fear of future arrest and prosecution under the two statutes did not rise above speculation and thus did not constitute an injury in fact.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit determined that the Students sufficiently pled an injury in fact. First, the court held that the Students showed a credible threat of prosecution because they alleged that they would likely have future encounters with officers in school, because of past enforcement against the same conduct, and because the respondent had not disavowed enforcement of such conduct in the future. Further, the allegation that black students were four times as likely to be charged made the threat of enforcement more credible. The court distinguished the present case from City of Los Angeles v. Lyons because the Students here alleged that there would be future encounters with officers at the school and that the statutes would authorize the respondents to violate the appellants’ rights to due process and free speech.
Second, the court held that the Students made a “sufficient showing of self-censorship, which occurs when a claimant is chilled from exercising his right to free expression.” Because the Students were in fear of enforcement against any minor infraction, they were justified in anticipating punishment for conduct that constitutes free expression as protected under the Constitution.
Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal of the case for lack of standing and remanded for further proceedings
Jonathan Todd